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Due to the country’s then drive towards European Union 
membership, a comprehensive administrative reform 
agenda had emerged in Turkey during early 2000s. But 
a brusque reversal of decentralisation reforms followed 
the 2010 constitutional referendum. The reform agenda 
adopted in the 2000s had been overturned to lead to an 
increasingly authoritarian and centralised power. This re-
centralisation movement had a direct impact on local gov-
ernance, triggering a decline of local autonomy accompa-
nied by the dismissal of elected mayors and city council 
members in some Kurdish-populated cities. The fast decay 
of democratic accountability was accompanied by clien-
telism and corruption. This paper tries to demonstrate how 
recentralisation in Turkey led to the erosion of local de-
mocracy through two analytical parameters used to assess 
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the quality of democracy:  the first parameter concerns the 
level of political autonomy, while the second pertains to 
whether local administrations’ decisions are safeguarded 
from arbitrary interference by the central government.
Keywords: decentralisation, local autonomy, recentralisati-
on, local reform, local democracy
1. Introduction1
The growing theoretical literature on decentralisation examines differ-
ent forms of decentralisation, basically political, administrative and fiscal 
(Litvack, Ahmad & Bird, 1998; Falleti, 2005). However, little attention 
has been paid to the interrelationship between two subtypes of decen-
tralisation, i.e. deconcentration and devolution (Santagati, Bonini Baraldi 
& Zan, 2020; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Wollmann, 2007). Decon-
centration, the weakest form of decentralisation, refers to “the transfer 
of administrative tasks from an upper to a lower layer of unit of state 
administration, typically through the establishment of regional or local 
field offices” (Wollman, 2007, p. 3). However, many authors claim that 
deconcentration and devolution reinforce one another and thus they are 
not considered as incompatible (Santagati, Bonini Baraldi & Zan, 2020; 
Diederichs & Luben, 1995; Cohen & Peterson, 1999; Cheema & Rondi-
nelli, 2007; Cole, 2012).
Decentralisation is defined by Rondinelli (1981, p. 137) as a process of 
state reform that transfers or delegates the legal and political authority to 
plan, determine, and manage public functions from the central govern-
ment and its agencies to subnational units or levels of government. De-
centralisation has been promoted by international governmental organ-
isations and policy think tanks with the intention of improving aspects of 
governance such as democracy, public participation, efficiency, transpar-
ency, and anti-corruption as well as issues of economic development. “De-
centralization now encompasses not only the transfer of power, authority, 
and responsibility within government but also the sharing of authority and 
resources for shaping public policy within society. In this expanding con-
1 This research has been financially supported by the Galatasaray University Re-
search Fund, under Grant 19.104.001.
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cept of governance decentralization practices can be categorized into at 
least four forms: administrative, political, fiscal, and economic.” (Cheema 
& Rondinelli, 2007, p. 6)
In the liberal tradition, decentralisation is the transfer of power from a 
central government to popularly elected local governments (Lipset, 1995, 
p. 335). “More practically, decentralisation is commonly revealed by the 
downloading of public functions to lower levels of government and, ideo-
logically, is associated with various turns in governance in the late twen-
tieth century, such as the neoliberalization of the state and New Public 
Management” (Loewen, 2018, p.  105). Several Nordic countries have 
long histories of decentralisation, and it has been widely recommended 
over the last four decades to strengthen democracy and economic adjust-
ment in the countries with formerly authoritarian regimes. The transfer of 
substantial fiscal, political, and administrative duties to subnational levels 
of government is evident on a global scale. There are three different forms 
or increasing degrees of decentralisation, namely deconcentration (open-
ing a branch office in another region), delegation (tasking a subnational 
government with carrying out certain functions), and devolution (allowing 
subnational governments to take over functions autonomously) as well as 
partnerships and privatisation (Rondinelli, 1981, p. 137; Loewen, 2018, 
p. 105). “A basic level of progress along each one of these dimensions – or 
what can be called minimum decentralization – provides local government 
with sufficient power for local democracy to emerge and then eventually 
consolidate. Assuming, again, that the national system is democratic, a lo-
cal system becomes a democracy when elected local officials are expected 
to respond and be held accountable primarily to their constituents, carry 
out functions sufficient to engage the local public’s interest, and exercise 
their legally established authority without being subjected to overriding fi-
nancial or other constraints from unelected or non-local elected officials.” 
(Bland, 2011, p. 72)
In other words, the right of citizens to participate in decision-making pro-
cedures on a local level promotes democracy.
A political trend of recentralisation and strengthening state control over 
local authorities is evident in and out of Europe (Kerléo, 2015, p. 795). 
Horga (2017, p. 67) argues that there is ample evidence that since 2007, 
recentralisation tendencies have prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe-
an countries. Precipitated by political or economic crises, European states 
are currently rationalising decentralised structures in order to achieve 
economies of scale, according to Kerléo (2015, pp. 796-797). These re-
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forms indicate a clear recentralisation of states or, in the least reactionary 
cases, obstacles to decentralisation, exemplified by the deferral of long-
awaited reforms in Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, and Ireland. 
“Perceived failures of decentralization point to a trend of re-centralization 
of regional policy in CEE countries, on the part of both national and EU 
levels, potentially exacerbating the trend of increasing regional polariza-
tion within countries. The cases of Estonia and Hungary illustrate these 
tendencies, drawing attention to national responses and the need for a 
continued dialogue on institutional development and EU Regional Policy 
reform in order to better target regional inequalities.” (Loewen, 2018, 
p. 103)
Kerléo (2015) proclaims that current local reforms inside and outside Eu-
rope have followed a similar political pattern of recentralising local power 
and reinforcing state control over local authorities. He also underscores 
that – midway between concentration and decentralisation – recentralisa-
tion not only implies a transfer of responsibility from local authorities to 
the state but also one that concentrates power in the more substantial of 
local authorities. Moreover, decentralisation is generally evaluated as an 
indicator of a state’s structural evolution, particularly with respect to the 
principles of free administration and subsidiarity. According to Kerléo, 
recentralisation is justified by deliberate simplification of the local and 
by the rationalisation of structure in order to avoid the overlapping of 
responsibilities and governing authorities (p. 795). It concentrates local 
level power, effectively reorganising decentralisation without challenging 
it. Recentralisation promotes a mainly economic approach by depriving 
decentralisation of – or overlooking – its underlying democratic principles. 
Recentralisation, which echoes contemporary attempts to better distrib-
ute competences among the levels of local authority, corresponds to state 
rescaling – that is to say, an institutional reorganisation of decentralisa-
tion by the state itself on essentially economic bases (pp. 811-812, 819).
In Turkey, central authorities claimed that their reforms marked the 
beginning of an era of recentralisation in which urban service delivery 
schemes would be rescaled to achieve economies of scale (Elicin, 2018; 
Yılmaz & Güner, 2017, p. 230). However, this economic reasoning has 
not been confirmed, and on the contrary, municipalities have ended up 
being more reliant on state funding. In opposition to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, the benefits of proximity were eradicated by the reforms, which 
generated a deficit of local accountability. A more centralised local ad-
ministration system, in which importance was specifically attached to the 
metropolitan level, was created (Yılmaz & Güner, 2017, p. 230). In fact, 
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recentralisation at the local level in Turkey strengthened the control of the 
central state over local administrations and accompanied the move of the 
national system away from democracy. So, unlike European cases, there 
is a significant interdependence between decentralisation and democracy, 
and recent recentralisation trends in Turkey can be interpreted as a direct 
threat to local democracy. Turkey’s recentralisation policy favours the ex-
ecutive as the sole arbiter of social and economic policy at various levels 
of government and systematically blocks democratic contestation of its 
policies as it increasingly adopts an authoritarian stance (Tansel, 2019, 
p. 321). Röth and colleagues (2016) argue that “the main factor prevent-
ing movement towards a more decentralized Turkish state is the ideo-
logical distance between neo-liberal and culturally conservative national 
governments in Ankara and the Marxist and culturally pluralist mobiliza-
tion of Kurdish political actors” (p. 586). The failure of decentralisation 
is closely linked to political conduct surrounding the Kurdish question; 
the regionalism and political autonomy that decentralisation would entail 
are both inconceivable for the Turkish state (Yıldızcan, 2018, p. 139). 
Yıldızcan stresses that the dynamic of recentralisation is a “natural ten-
dency” in Turkey when one takes into consideration the fact that there 
are no regional political entities per se beyond provincial administrations 
which are firmly controlled by the central authorities. Municipalities have, 
therefore, always deferred to the strict authority of the central govern-
ment.
In the early 2000s, a comprehensive administrative reform agenda 
emerged in Turkey due to both domestic and international factors. At the 
time, Turkey’s candidacy for membership in the European Union was a 
key element at the national level. Indeed, Turkey projected the impres-
sion that it was attaching increased importance to reforming the govern-
ment, public administration, and local administrations in the context of 
strengthening decentralisation and democratisation. Although the Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, or Justice and Development Party) government 
initially defended decentralisation and the downsizing of the state, the 
power and interference of the central government increased, especially 
in the areas of housing and social policy. A brusque reversal of the de-
centralising reforms followed the 2010 constitutional referendum. The 
democratic reform agenda adopted in the 2000s was overturned, leading 
to increasingly authoritarian, centralised power. Recentralising policies 
were implemented through legislation and later through more controver-
sial legal means, like decree laws, which increased the power of the centre 
over local administrations. Finally, in April 2017, a narrowly approved 
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referendum opened up an era of presidentialism in which power is con-
centrated in the hands of the executive without checks and balances. This 
drive toward recentralisation has had a direct impact on local governance, 
effectively making local administrations subservient to the whims of the 
president (Kuyucu, 2018, pp. 1171-1172).
This article demonstrates that – because its roots concerned the concen-
tration of power at the central level rather than a preoccupation with ef-
ficiency – recentralisation in Turkey led to the erosion of local democ-
racy. To demonstrate the devastating effects of recentralisation, I refer to 
Bland’s (2011) framework of local democracy; however, I base my evalu-
ation on two of the conditions underscored by Bland that I consider most 
critical for analysing the state of local administrations in Turkey.
The first question concerns the level of political autonomy. Local democ-
racy must involve a minimum level of political autonomy to incentivise 
local officials to act on behalf of the citizenry (Bland, 2011, p. 73). The 
functions regularly fulfilled by local governments must have sufficient po-
litical significance for the citizens to realise that the decisions that affect 
their lives and communities are made by local administrations. So, do lo-
cal administrations in Turkey have effective power to govern?
The second question concerns whether the local administrations’ deci-
sions are safeguarded from arbitrary interference by the central govern-
ment and whether the arbitrary removal of locally elected officials is ef-
fectively precluded. The term “arbitrary” designates “procedures that are 
used or potentially used with some regularity, usually for a primarily po-
litical objective that does not in practice serve a clear local public pur-
pose or the purpose for which they were intended” (Bland, 2011, p. 72). 
Precluding the arbitrary removal of locally elected officials is considered 
a critical component of local democracy. Indeed, Bland argues that the 
“arbitrary removal of elected local officials violates the expressed will of 
the locality” (p. 73). Although there are serious concerns about free and 
fair elections, freedom of expression, and free access to alternative me-
dia in Turkey, elections still constitute one of the rare institutions that 
reinforces democracy. This study combines both the existing literature 
and original research based on an analysis of pre-existing data, namely 
the texts of legislative reforms to the system of local governance as well 
as grey literature produced by institutions such as the Turkish Court of 
Accounts (Sayıştisay Başkanlığı), TOKI
·
 (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı, 
the government-backed Housing Development Agency of Turkey), and 
individual municipalities.
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2. The Effective Power of Local Administrations to 
Govern: Administrative and Financial Autonomy
Administrative and financial decentralisation is imperative for local au-
thorities to have a significant level of political authority (Dahl, 1971, 
p. 82; Bland, 2011, p. 74). The administrative autonomy of local admin-
istrations in Turkey has been limited by a series of legal and institutional 
reforms. On one hand, certain competencies of local administrations were 
gradually shifted to the central government, and interference by the cen-
tral state in the affairs of metropolitan municipalities burgeoned. On the 
other, through the rescaling of several special provincial administrations 
(SPAs) in 2012, town municipalities and villages were abolished, 14 new 
metropolitan municipalities were created, and the revenues of local ad-
ministrations were readjusted.
2.1.  Central State Domination of the Local Agenda
In the last two decades in Turkey, a strong centralisation tendency stands 
out with respect to urban governance, and urban policy has also become 
instrumentalised in national politics as a result of the financialisation of 
urban redevelopment. For this reason, central state interventions in urban 
space have multiplied, especially in Istanbul. The then Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan presented and imposed his personal “big projects” 
for Istanbul during his national election campaign in 2011. These were 
comprised of the renovation of Taksim Square, which gave rise to the 
Gezi protests; a third bridge over the Bosphorus; Canal Istanbul (an arti-
ficial waterway paralleling the Bosphorus); a third airport; and Galataport 
(a retail-oriented landing for cruise ships), among others. Erdoğan pro-
claimed “mad projects” for other cities, as well, like the Northern Aegean 
Port of Çandarlı in Izmir, which was to transform the area into one of Tur-
key’s most important logistics hubs. In Istanbul, where such projects were 
severely contested by the civil society, the AKP-affiliated mayor remained 
on the sidelines, leaving the stage to central authorities. The concern with 
these projects is that they were launched without any reference to the ur-
ban policies and physical plans developed by the city itself. Moreover, the 
Canal Istanbul project even contravenes a national policy advocating the 
reversal of the densification of urban populations, particularly in Istanbul 
(see the country’s 10th and 11th five-year plans); the project provides for 
the creation of a satellite city of at least 500 thousand inhabitants. Yet, on 
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25 March 2020, the government held the first tender for the project when 
the country was battling the COVID-19 pandemic.2
Interventionism at the local level of city management opened up impor-
tant opportunities for central actors. Some existing institutions were re-
modelled and empowered to facilitate intervention by the state. They were 
transformed into extremely powerful central actors that controlled the cre-
ation and allocation of urban rent previously controlled by municipalities. 
Consequently, municipalities gradually lost power to central authorities, 
namely the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation and TOKI
·
.
The prerogatives of TOKI
·
, which was originally established in 1984 to 
finance collective housing cooperatives organised by the middle classes, 
have grown considerably since 2001 through a number of legal directives. 
In 2004, the real estate assets of the General Directorate of Building Land 
Office were transferred to TOKI
·
 (Law No. 5273 of 15 December 2004), 
which was authorised to be involved in land banking and the expropria-
tion of land for housing, education, industry, health, tourism, and pub-
lic institutions. It was thus transformed into the country’s largest public 
landowner and real estate developer and enjoyed the power to regulate all 
development of public land. Indeed, housing construction is now only one 
facet of TOKI
·
’s activities; it also undertakes the construction of mosques, 
stadiums, sports facilities, schools, viaducts, dispensaries, police stations, 
prisons, private hospitals, and shopping centres.
However, the source of TOKI
·
’s supremacy is that it is endowed with ex-
ceptional, even hegemonic power to undertake urban planning. In 2004, 
it acquired urban planning rights over large stocks of public land that 
came into its possession at no cost, as well as over all public land reserved 
for mass housing and squatter prevention. In other words, it became an 
aggrandised planning powerhouse (Law No. 5273 of 15 December 2004). 
Another one of TOKI
·
’s critical powers concerns urban renewal. Legisla-
tion on urban transformation attributed important planning, regulation, 
and investment powers to TOKI
·
, turning it into the most important player 
in the urban land market.
The Law on Urban Transformation (Law No. 6306 of 16 May 2012) em-
powered the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation as well as TOKI
·
, 
restraining municipal authorities via the centralisation of urban planning 



























(Elicin, 2014, p. 150). TOKI
·
, which was previously under the charge of 
the prime minister, was attached to the Ministry of Environment and Ur-
banisation in 2018. It maintains a top-down, hierarchical relationship with 
local authorities, which are neither consulted nor invited to participate in 
TOKI
·
’s interventions. Another remarkable indicator of the centralisation 
of urban planning is the ratio of executive decisions made by the cabinet in 
the field of urban redevelopment, which increased to 45% in 2014 up from 
5% in 2009. The most important of these decisions concern expropriations 
for large infrastructure works and urban regeneration projects (Kuyucu, 
2018, p. 1158). Kuyucu also underscores the number of interventions by 
TOKI
·
 that nullified the decisions of local administrations (p. 1159). In-
deed, in Kartal, one of the second-tier municipalities of Istanbul, TOKI
·
 
turned an area declared by the municipality to be an urban transformation 
zone into a “special project area” and constructed residential towers there, 
notwithstanding strong opposition from the municipality.
The central state’s other initiative reflecting its aspiration to recentralise 
and strengthen control over local administrations concerns data and in-
formation operating systems run by local administrations. According to 
an amendment to the Law on Municipalities (Law No. 5393 Amendment 
3 of 15 February 2018), all municipalities are to collect their data on an 
e-municipality system created and controlled by the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Urbanisation in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior. 
Thus, they cannot maintain independent data and information operating 
systems.
2.2.  Rescaling at the Local Level
Another centralisation policy of the government involved major territorial 
and administrative rescaling at the metropolitan level: 14 new metropoli-
tan municipalities were created in 2012, increasing the total number to 
30. The new regulation abolished SPAs, which were local provincial ad-
ministrations, and extended the purviews of the new municipalities to the 
borders of the province. The population criterion was also adjusted. Previ-
ous legislation had designated that an urban population of 750 thousand 
was necessary to create a metropolitan municipality, but the new bench-
mark was 750 thousand inhabitants living anywhere within provincial lim-
its – including the residents of sparsely populated rural territories. Conse-
quently, with the doubling of metropolitan provinces across the country, 
metropolitan municipalities came to account for 50% of the geographical 
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area and 76% of the national population, irrespective of geographic and 
demographic contingencies (Arıkboğa, 2013, p. 71). An initial purge was 
realised in May 2008 when municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants 
were eliminated. This rescaling resulted in the eradication of a significant 
number of town and district municipalities along with SPAs in metro-
politan provinces, which entailed a drop in the number of locally elected 
representatives. “A more consolidated model of metropolitan government 
was established without addressing the decline in democratic representa-
tiveness of the new model (as the number of seats that were lost by clos-
ing down small-scale municipalities were not compensated for in the re-
maining elected offices)” (Beltan, 2018, pp. 96-97). The new model also 
involved a transfer of responsibility to the largest local authority – that 
is, to the metropolitan municipality – hence a recentralisation was taking 
place at the metropolitan level. The 2012 reform, which adopted a top-
down, heavy-handed approach that abolished almost half of the country’s 
municipalities without any referendum or consultation with citizens, was 
deemed a violation of the constitution and the European Charter of Lo-
cal Self-Government and therefore a threat to local democracy by many 
authors (Gözler, 2013; Elicin, 2018; Yılmaz & Güner, 2017).
According to Bayraktar (2018), the failure of reforms in 2004 that had 
bolstered the sanction of the governor-ruled SPAs triggered their subse-
quent abolition (p. 121). Yet these governors, who were particularly cru-
cial in the cities ruled by the opposition, were immediately compensated 
with a pivotal role in Investment Monitoring and Coordination Direc-
torates (IMCDs) created by the 2012 reform in metropolitan provinces 
where SPAs had been abolished. These directorates were established to 
develop the participation and potential of regional actors as a means for 
the central state to counterbalance its new scalar strategies. The IMCDs 
resulted in the allocation of extra powers to governors and district gover-
nors (Yıldızcan & Bayraktar, 2017, p. 4), who were placed at the head of 
these new structures of governance. The governors and district governors 
thus gained significant influence over local administrations and the design 
of local policy as they had the arbitrary power to choose who would par-
ticipate in policymaking.
During the state of emergency declared after the failed 2016 coup, these 
directorates were given additional powers by Decree Law No. 674, which 
was liable to jeopardise local autonomy. First, they were given more pre-
rogatives and financial resources as well as legal personhood, which can 
be interpreted as administrative centralisation. Second, the decree further 
stipulated that in the case of a disruption to the services and investment 
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carried out by public institutions, governors could undertake the delivery 
of these services through the IMCDs. (In normal circumstances, in the 
case of such an insufficiency or disruption of service provision, a judge 
would warn the municipality and the delivery of the services in question 
would be demanded from the Ministry of the Interior. Only in cases where 
this request was not fulfilled was the governor authorised to intervene.) 
A second imposition that jeopardised local autonomy was that the decree 
law specified that in the fight against terrorism and violence, the governor 
could designate an institution (most probably the IMCD) that could be 
put in charge without needing the approval of the judiciary. According to 
Keleş and Özgül (2017), this violates the constitution as it establishes a 
hierarchical relationship between central authorities and local administra-
tions that far exceeds tutelage and that evinces recentralisation (p. 303). 
So as a result of the legal amendments adopted during a state of emer-
gency, there was a strong shift in favour of recentralisation with respect 
to the relationship between central authorities and local administrations.
2.3.  Financial Autonomy
Financial autonomy is a sine qua non condition for a local administration 
system to fulfil its responsibilities (Bland, 2011, p. 75). Sufficient finan-
cial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely within the 
framework of their powers, should be guaranteed to local administrations 
in national economic policy (Art. 9 of the European Charter of Local 
Self- Government). “Local own revenue sources are often utterly inad-
equate to finance the responsibilities assigned, while intergovernmental 
transfers are vulnerable to political manipulation, poorly designed allo-
cation formulae and inappropriate conditions” (Devas & Delay, 2006, 
p. 685). Decentralisation matters for strengthening local democracy be-
cause local administrations are inclined to produce solutions destined to 
generate capacity and financial resources. For this reason, Yilmaz and his 
colleagues (2010) argue that devolving a certain level of responsibility for 
expenditures to local government together with financial autonomy are a 
necessity.
In Turkey, the 2012 reforms increased the amount of intergovernmental 
transfers without giving local taxation powers to local administrations. The 
percentage of general tax revenues going to local governments was modi-
fied to increase the part of their total revenues stemming from transfers 
from the central state. The increase was most noteworthy for metropoli-
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tan municipalities, as more than 75% of their total revenues in 2015 came 
from such transfers (Yılmaz & Güner, 2017, p. 241). Yılmaz and Güner, 
who examined the results of recent modifications to the intergovernmen-
tal fiscal system, conclude that they did not reinforce the fiscal autonomy 
of local governments. “On the contrary, local governments are becom-
ing heavily dependent on central government transfers. The decline in 
the share of own-source revenues weakens the downward accountability 
linkage towards citizens. The only positive aspect of these changes is that 
there is no conditionality imposed on transfer revenues – they are mainly 
unconditional for municipalities.” (Yılmaz & Güner, 2017, p. 247)
Yılmaz and Güner (2017, p. 248) also claim that in Turkey the (down-
ward) accountability relationships between citizens and local governments 
are weak, given the limited ability of citizens to be involved in the local 
planning and budgeting processes. Significant obstacles impede access 
to information concerning municipal finances. “More importantly, there 
is a need for social scrutiny of local government budget and tracking of 
expenditure to ensure downward accountability of all local governments’ 
financial operations” (Yılmaz & Güner, 2017, p. 141). Upward account-
ability structures were introduced into the legal system, but it is difficult 
to claim that they were implemented effectively. In Turkey, the Court 
of Accounts is the main institution charged with financial regulation of 
public administration. But over the last decades, it has not filed any legal 
actions against AKP-controlled municipalities, even though it has identi-
fied and disclosed some irregular or illegal actions on their part.3 Indeed, 
strong accountability and transparency are not desirable for the central 
government as patronage and clientelistic relations at the local and met-
ropolitan levels (as well as the central level) are particularly important for 
both national and local electioneering. The exchange of votes and in-kind 
or cash contributions for political patronage jeopardises downward ac-
countability. As a consequence of the dependence of metropolitan munic-
ipalities on revenues transferred from the centre, as well as the decline of 
accountable, transparent institutions, local discretion and accountability 
have deteriorated (Yılmaz & Güner, 2017, p. 247).
Indeed, patronage politics in municipalities are documented in several 
academic studies, including those of Aytaç (2014), who writes about 
the distribution of public goods and services in return for votes; Eligur, 
(2009), who studied the distribution of appliances, coal, and food baskets; 
3 See https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/
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and Erder and I
·
ncioğlu (2008). Furthermore, Ağırel (2019) and Toker4 
transcribed case files concerning corruption and scamming by AKP mu-
nicipalities that were documented by the Court of Accounts5 but did not 
lead to any investigation because, as Çeviker-Gürakar and Bircan (2019) 
demonstrate, the AKP’s political sustainability is assured by dependency 
networks. AKP municipalities established clientelistic networks that en-
sured the perseverance of the party by transferring colossal sums to politi-
cally connected private sector firms through outsourcing procurements. 
A substantial number of contracts was given to firms with close ties to 
the party or to those owned by municipal council members themselves. In 
that way, municipal procurements became the tools of favouritism and fi-
nancing party politics. These municipalities also collaborated with Islamic 
charity organisations – ostensibly NGOs – that have close connections to 
AKP officials, including Erdoğan. By and large founded by AKP munici-
palities, these NGOs became the mediators in a politics of redistribution 
used to negotiate votes. Electoral losses in major cities in the most recent 
local elections damaged these dependency networks and thus the political 
stability of the AKP.
Especially after these electoral defeats, central state control over the fi-
nances of local administrations turned into an instrument of oppression 
used at the discretion of the ruling party. Indeed, the central state selec-
tively opts not to hold municipalities that are under the control of the 
ruling party in check, which in turn threatens local democracy. Because 
of the poor management that accompanies patronage politics, the accu-
mulated debt of these municipalities is growing exponentially.6 Istanbul, 
a city governed by the AKP or its founders since 1994, has a budget for 
2019 of over 4 billion dollars. When transportation and water manage-
ment agencies are included, the total budget exceeds 6 billion. According 
to the 2018 oversight report submitted to the parliament, the metropoli-
tan municipality (including its 28 companies and partners) is 4 billion dol-
lars in debt. Legitimate processes like financial audits are necessary and 
inevitable safeguards for local democracy, but the incontestably inefficient 
management over the last decades has never been scrutinised. Patronage 












of democracy in Turkey (Heper & Keyman, 1998). The “AKP selectively 
enforced anti-corruption measures in a way that consolidates its power by 
changing existing intuitionalist structures. In this regard, anti-corruption-
related institutional change in the public sector, to a great extent, accom-
modated corruption, instead of eliminating it” (Soyaltin, 2017, p. 452).
In an ironic twist, the incompetent management of municipalities was 
used as an argument to convince citizens to vote once again for the rul-
ing party in the 2019 elections; AKP-governed municipalities, it was ar-
gued, could manage the predicament, but it would be a major impedi-
ment should the opposition take over. Underscoring the poor financial 
situation of municipalities (predominantly those that had for years been 
ruled by AKP-affiliated mayors), the president and chairman of the party, 
Erdoğan, stated in a televised interview on 27 March 2019, the eve of the 
local elections, that “municipalities that will not be in accord with the cen-
tral administration will go bankrupt. They will not even be able to govern 
if they win.”7 Similarly, given the AKP majorities in the local city councils 
of Istanbul and Ankara, the president called the new mayors-elect from 
the opposition “lame ducks.”8
Indeed, following its eventual defeat in the local elections,9 the central 
state created new tools to put financial pressure on metropolitan munici-
palities. A modification to the law on intergovernmental transfers that 
was adopted on 2 July 2019, reinforced the authority of the president over 
İlbank (previously Bank of Provinces), the institution that directs inter-
governmental transfers to municipalities and SPAs apart from transfers 
that are directly channelled to metropolitan municipalities by the Min-
istry of Finance. I
·
lbank also provides financial support to local adminis-
trations with medium and long-term loans. Another modification to the 
same law adopted on 17 January 2019, handed the president control over 
the financial aides to be delegated to the municipalities by the Director-
ate of Strategy and Budget.
I
·
lbank thus has the power to withhold up to 40% of the transfer reve-




9 The AKP-led alliance lost the most important metropolitan municipalities; 11 of 



























ments, and other delinquent debts to public entities. These cuts were ar-
bitrarily implemented especially for opposition municipalities run by the 
pro-Kurdish Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP, or Peoples’ Democratic 
Party). These deductions at the source, implemented without warning by 
the central state via I
·
lbank, are a potential risk to the stability and predict-
ability of the transfer system. The fact that these deductions were stopped 
for the four months before the 31 March 2019 local elections10 suggests 
the instrumentalisation of I
·
lbank by the central state. Moreover, since the 
status of I
·
lbank was changed to a joint stock company in February 2011, 
the bank has ceased delivering comprehensive information about deduc-
tions at the source except for the total amount of transfers to SPAs and 
municipalities. Yılmaz and Güner (2017) state that the bank hides behind 
the banking law in rejecting requests for information (p. 245).
Another recent state intervention that put municipalities in a financially 
difficult position concerned the funding of subway construction realised 
by the central state on behalf of municipalities. On 30 April 2019, a presi-
dential decree stipulated that a 5% cut would be taken from the munici-
palities’ share of general tax revenues for this purpose. Previously, the cut 
was 5% of subway revenues. The newly-elected mayor of Ankara stated in 
his report on his first 100 days in office that this change meant the share 
paid by the municipality would be 20 times greater.11
The mayor of Istanbul has had to seek foreign loans for uncompleted 
infrastructure projects because Turkey’s state lenders have refused financ-
ing for the municipality, and publicly owned banks have ceased extending 
even short-term credit to Istanbul and other municipalities controlled by 
the opposition.12 The government has even banned CHP-run metropoli-
tan municipalities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir from collecting dona-
tions to help people in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, accus-
ing them of acting without the permission from the state government. The 
bank accounts of the municipalities used for collecting donations have 














3. Control over the Decisions of Local 
Administrations and the Arbitrary Removal of 
Locally Elected Officials
Intergovernmental relations have a substantial effect on the degree of 
control over local administrations’ decisions. The autonomy of local ad-
ministrations vis-à-vis the central government is a delicate issue, so the 
relationship between a given local administration and the central state 
is crucial. The decisions of local authorities must be protected from ar-
bitrary intervention by the central administration (Bland, 2011, p. 70). 
A good relationship guarantees the support of the centre, and this is the 
case when both local and central authorities belong to the same political 
party. On the other hand, municipalities controlled by opposition par-
ties encounter many problems on the administrative and financial levels. 
Beltan (2018) argues that the central government, which was “heavily im-
bued by partisan politics and rivalry, blocked or obstructed opposition 
municipality projects in I
·
zmir,14 a stronghold of the opposition (CHP) 
since the mid- 1990s, and Diyarbakır; bastion of pro-Kurd parties. Al-
though the center financed some large-scale transportation projects in 
I
·
zmir, these were to show their capacity to transform the city into a com-
petitive metropolis and to indicate their pledge for more in the case the 
governing party was to take over the metropolitan municipality.” (Beltan, 
2018, p. 145)
Opposition-affiliated municipalities also face numerous strategies de-
signed to disgrace them, varying from auditing raids, heavily publicised 
corruption allegations targeting ranking municipal authorities including 
mayors, and condescending lectures by government officials. “I
·
zmir’s mu-
nicipalities and the CHP leaders have claimed that the central govern-
ment has been highly biased and inconsistent towards their municipalities 
and others across the country. They argued that the central government’s 
dealings with I
·
zmir’s municipalities have been far from objective and fair, 
accusing the center of a campaign to defame their municipalities in order 
to win over the city in the future elections – national and local.” (Beltan, 
2018, pp. 147-148)
14 On 28 November 2018, the mayor of the city deplored the fact that the municipality 
had submitted a subway project for Buca to the Ministry of Development a year earlier but 
was still awaiting approval. https://www.izmir.bel.tr/tr/Haberler/izmire-su-yok/39202/156
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In Diyarbakır, both the lower and upper tiers of the metropolitan munici-
pality are criticised by state officials regarding their performance in ser-
vice delivery and their lack of competitiveness and efficiency in governing 
the metropolitan area. The municipalities, on the other hand, claim that 
municipal activities are deliberately blocked by the central state and its 
local agents (the governor and district governors) who “did not approve 
or put on hold many of their projects and cut their spending by obstruct-
ing the release of foreign funds for municipal projects” (Beltan, 2018, 
p. 196). Beltan further asserts that “the administrative tutelage had an 
added political bias – perception tutelage – in the region” (p. 239).
In Turkey, due to weakening institutions and excessive politicisation, the 
instruments for ensuring democratic governance themselves are frequent-
ly used as pretences for interference by the central state. This tendency 
towards strengthening the central state’s control over local administra-
tions accelerated during the state of emergency that was announced in 
the aftermath of the botched 2016 coup attempt and was sustained until 
17 July 2018. A decree law issued by the government on 1 September 
2016 was adopted by the parliament and became law on 10 November 
2016. Amendments to the Law on Municipalities by Decree Law No. 674 
(Art. 38 – 40) stipulated that appointed trustees would decide on replace-
ment mayors, deputy mayors, and council members for those who were 
suspended, detained, or dismissed from public service in relation to the 
offense of aiding and abetting terrorism or terrorist organisations. Like-
wise, these amendments authorised state authorities to interfere in the 
local affairs of municipalities with respect to the fight against terrorism.
Thousands of elected mayors and councillors were dismissed in Kurdish 
provinces, and most were incarcerated indefinitely on the grounds that 
they were affiliated with the PKK and thus a threat to national security af-
ter the 2016 failed coup attempt. State officials, which is to say governors 
and district governors, were appointed to replace these dismissed mayors 
and councillors under the moniker “trustee” (kayyım in Turkish), a novelty 
in Turkish public law. Eighty-one of the eighty-eight mayors dismissed 
by December 2016 were members of the pro-Kurdish Demokratik Böl-
geler Partisi (DBP, or Democratic Regions Party) (Keles & Ozgül, 2017, 
p. 310). The Diyarbakır municipality, considered the bastion of the Kurd-
ish political movement, was the main target of such persecution (Kuyucu, 
2018, pp. 1171-1172).
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe 
states in Resolution No. 416, which was adopted on 29 March 2017, that 
514





Decree Law No. 674 is incompatible with the European Charter of Lo-
cal Self-Government, that it could be used as a means to restrict local 
self-government, and that it contributed to a turn toward the “recentrali-
sation” of Turkey in practice. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commis-
sion further states that the provisions of the decree “allow interference 
by state authorities in the effective exercise of local self-government in 
certain municipalities in the context of the fight against terrorism.”15 The 
commission notes the congress’ repeated calls for the abolition of admin-
istrative tutelage and for genuine decentralisation in Turkey. It calls on 
Turkish authorities to revoke the provisions introduced by the decree law. 
Keles and Ozgül (2017) further argue that the clauses added to the Law 
on Municipalities by the decree law, as well as the powers of appointment 
bestowed upon trustees are violations of the constitution (p. 306).
The local elections of 31 March 2019 constituted an important turning 
point for local politics in Turkey. The intervention of the central govern-
ment in local politics acquired another dimension during which the presi-
dent, once a politically neutral position, campaigned in favour of his party’s 
candidates. However, the major opposition party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(CHP, or Republican People’s Party) won in 11 of the 30 metropolitan 
municipalities including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana, while the 
HDP won in most of the eastern cities that had previously been placed 
under the administration of trustees. However, on 19 August 2019, less 
than five months after their election, the mayors of the HDP-ruled met-
ropolitan municipalities of Diyarbakır, Van, and Mardin were dismissed 
on the grounds that they were under investigation for alleged misuse of 
public office and ongoing terror-related allegations. By 23 March 2020, 
the government had appointed trustees to 40 out of 65 municipalities 
won by the HDP since the March 2019 local elections.16 Replacements 
for these dismissed officials were appointed by the trustees, namely the 
governors of the respective cities. The practice of employing trustees has 
been predominantly reserved for Kurdish cities, whereas in western cities 
when a mayor is removed from duty due to an investigation, the munici-
pal council elects a new mayor from within its ranks, as was the case for 
some AKP- and MHP-led municipalities in 2016.17 Indeed, the president 





























and chairman of the AKP, Erdoğan, declared before the 2019 local elec-
tions that trustees would be appointed immediately in Kurdish munici-
palities when there was a question of terror-related activity.18 However, in 
December 2019, the mayor of one of the district municipalities of I
·
zmir 
metropolitan municipality elected from the main opposition party CHP, 
was dismissed from duty on 18 December 2019 over alleged links to the 
Gülen network.19  
It is important to differentiate between the removal procedures for may-
ors and councillors affiliated with the governing party and those to which 
certain opposition-affiliated – which is to say, pro-Kurdish – mayors and 
councillors are subjected. Indeed, in September 2016 (foreshadowing the 
2019 local elections), a number of sitting AKP mayors as well as provin-
cial chairmen of the party were forced to resign at Erdoğan’s behest under 
the pretext of remedying “fatigue” within the party. The mayors of Istan-
bul, Ankara, Bursa, and Balıkesir eventually announced their resignations 
over the course of 2017. According to the opposition, their removals were 
carried out in lieu of prosecuting them for alleged crimes, notably corrup-
tion. “Erdoğan (actually acknowledged) that some mayors from his party 
acted outside the law and he forced them to resign instead of handing 
them over to justice” (Hurtas, 2017). Indeed, no investigation has been 
opened into these mayors, and in these cities, metropolitan councils voted 
on a replacement mayor.
Turkey is in an ongoing process of democratic decline, and its political 
system is regressing into what some authors call “Erdoğanism” (Yilmaz 
& Bashirov, 2018; Çağaptay & Aktaş 2017), which combines elements of 
electoral authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, populism, and Islamism. 
Frequent and fair elections with secret ballots that are conducted on the 
basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage are a minimum threshold for local 
democracy (Bland, p. 70; Council of Europe, 1985). Over the previous 
decade, scholars (Yılmaz & Turner, 2019; Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018), po-
litical parties, and NGOs have expressed concern about the security and 
reliability of elections in Turkey. Several NGOs like Vote and Beyond (Oy 
ve Otesi) were created to ensure transparency and observe ballot counts. 
Some 56 thousand volunteers successfully monitored Turkey’s 7th June 











organisations and labour union confederations formed the Fair Election 
Platform before the 2018 presidential election. Concerns about election 
security and the impartiality of the Supreme Electoral Council have been 
substantiated, particularly during the 2019 local elections when the coun-
cil resolved that mayors-elect who had previously been dismissed by a 
presidential decree in a crackdown following the 2016 failed coup attempt 
were not entitled to assume their offices even though the same council 
had approved their candidacy prior to the elections.20 The mandates in 
these contests were given to runner-up AKP candidates instead of rerun-
ning the elections. Indeed, another debatable decision was the one to 
rerun the Istanbul election.
4.  Conclusion
In Turkey, modifications to the system of local administration in the di-
rection of recentralisation stem from the determination to strengthen the 
central state. There are two main pillars of territorial recentralisation: first, 
after the collapse of the so-called “peace process”, the Kurdish question 
has been treated as an issue of security, order, and sovereignty. Embracing 
an extremely nationalist discourse, the state put the screws to HDP-ruled 
municipalities and disqualified mayors-elect in major Kurdish-populated 
cities. Although they have been covertly threatened with a similar mea-
sure, few trustees have been appointed to CHP municipalities. Second, 
“the provision of public welfare as ‘charitable patronage’, redistribution 
of public resources, and access to public jobs, health services and public 
housing” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018, p. 1819) constituted the major assets 
of dependency networks created between the AKP and its electors. Taking 
into account the crucial role played by municipalities in the constitution 
of these networks, control over municipalities became imperative for the 
central state. Because controlling them through the ballot box has turned 
out to be an arduous challenge, the prerogatives of municipalities have 
been progressively scaled back by the centre, and financial pressure has 
been put especially on those municipalities controlled by the opposition. 
The biased measures of the government particularly hit the municipalities 



























by the ruling party do have much room to negotiate vis-à-vis the central 
power anyway. Consequently, in Turkey, democratic practices at the level 
of local administration are in blatant regression.
Having lost one major mechanism for preserving a patronage politics that 
is nourished and maintained by local administrations to democratic alter-
nation, the state may take further steps to reinforce its control and recen-
tralisation. Indeed, a journalist close to the AKP has already mentioned 
Erdoğan’s desire to eliminate the election of mayors in favour of a new 
system of centrally appointing them.21 Forced to cohabitate with oppo-
sition-affiliated local administrations, the central state may also attempt 
to limit the executive powers of mayors. Nevertheless, even in a margin-
alised local democracy, mayors still have some tools at their disposal and 
should put them into service to reinforce and expand democratic rights. 
The fact that municipal council meetings are now publicly broadcast and 
that investigations have been opened into the financial dealings realised 
during previous administrations already demonstrates that there are still 
opportunities to advance the local autonomy that is at risk.
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THE UNBEARABLE FAILURE OF DECENTRALISATION  
IN TURKEY 
Summary
Due to the country’s then drive towards European Union membership, a com-
prehensive administrative reform agenda had emerged in Turkey during early 
2000s. But a brusque reversal of decentralisation reforms followed the 2010 
constitutional referendum. The democratic reform agenda adopted in the 2000s 
has been overturned to lead to an increasingly authoritarian and centralised 
power. This recentralisation movement had a direct impact on local governance, 
triggering a decline of local autonomy accompanied by the dismissal of elected 
mayors and city council members in some Kurdish-populated cities. The fast 
decay of democratic accountability was accompanied by clientelism and corrup-
tion. Indeed, modifications to the system of local administration in the direction 
of recentralisation stem from the determination to strengthen the central state. 
Embracing an extremely nationalist discourse, on the one hand, the state put 
the screws to HDP-ruled municipalities and disqualified mayors-elect in major 
Kurdish-populated cities. On the other hand, the provision of public welfare as 
‘charitable patronage’, redistribution of public resources, and access to public 
jobs, health services and public housing constituted the major assets of depen-
dency networks created between the AKP and its electors. Taking into account 
the crucial role played by municipalities in the constitution of these networks, 
control over municipalities became imperative for the central state. Nevertheless, 
even in a marginalised local democracy, mayors still have some tools at their 
disposal and should put them into service to reinforce and expand democratic 
rights.
Keywords: decentralisation, local autonomy, recentralisation, local reform, lo-
cal democracy
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NEPODNOŠLJIVI NEUSPJEH DECENTRALIZACIJE U TURSKOJ 
Sažetak
Zbog težnji prema članstvu u Europskoj uniji u Turskoj je početkom 2000-ih 
počela sveobuhvatna upravna reforma. Međutim, nakon ustavnoga referendu-
ma 2000. uslijedio je oštar preokret u pogledu decentralizacijskih reformi. Pro-
gram demokratskih reformi usvojen 2000-ih ukinut je te se krenulo u smjeru sve 
autoritarnije i centraliziranije vlasti. Taj pokret ponovne centralizacije izravno 
je utjecao na lokalno upravljanje, dovevši do smanjenja lokalne autonomije te 
razrješenja izabranih gradonačelnika i članova gradskih vijeća u nekim grado-
vima s kurdskim stanovništvom. Brzo slabljenje demokratske odgovornosti bilo je 
popraćeno klijentelizmom i korupcijom. Promjene sustava lokalne samouprave 
u smjeru ponovne centralizacije proizlaze iz odlučnosti da se ojača središnja 
država. Usvajajući krajnje nacionalistički diskurs, država je, s jedne strane, 
vršila pritisak na općine kojima upravlja HDP (politička stranka Halkların 
Demokratik Partisi) i diskvalificirala izabrane gradonačelnike u najvećim gra-
dovima s kurdskim stanovništvom. S druge strane, pružanjem socijalne skrbi kao 
milosrdne zaštite, preraspodjelom javnih sredstava i pristupom poslovima u jav-
nom sektoru, zdravstvenim uslugama i socijalnom stanovanju AKP-a (politička 
stranka Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) stvarala je mrežu ovisnosti svojih birača. 
Imajući u vidu ključnu ulogu koju su općine igrale u pružanju tih usluga, kon-
trola nad općinama postala je imperativ. Unatoč tomu, čak i u marginalizira-
noj lokalnoj demokraciji, gradonačelnici još uvijek imaju na raspolaganju neka 
sredstva koja trebaju iskoristiti kako bi ojačali i proširili demokratska prava.
Ključne riječi: decentralizacija, lokalna autonomija, recentralizacija, reforma 
lokalne samouprave, lokalna demokracija
